The paper reports laboratory experiments on a day-to-day route choice game with two routes. Subjects had to choose between a main road M and a side road S. The capacity was greater for the main road. 18 subjects participated in each session. In equilibrium the number of subjects is 12 on M and 6 on S.
Introduction
Understanding individual travel behaviour is essential for the design of Advanced Traveller Information Systems (ATIS), which provide real-time travel information, like link travel times (ADLER AND BLUE 1998 , BARFIELD AND DINGUS 1998 . However, the response of road users to information is still an open question (E.G., BEN-AKIVA 1991 , BONSALL 1992 , MAHMASSANI AND LIU 1999 . It is not clear whether more information is beneficial (BEN-AKIVA ET AL. 1991).
Drivers confronted with too much information may become oversaturated in the sense that information processing becomes to difficult and users develop simple heuristics to solve the problem (GIGERENZER ET AL. 1999).
Drivers may also overreact to information and thereby cause additional fluctuations. Thus, the behaviour of the drivers has to be incorporated in the forecast (e.g. WAHLE ET AL. 2000, BEN-AKIVA , BONSALL 1992 . ATIS can reduce fluctuations only if behavioural effects are correctly taken into account.
The Literature reports a number of experiments on route choice behaviour (e.g. BONSALL 1992, MAHMASSANI AND LIU 1999). Here we focus on the route choice in a generic two route scenario, which already has been investigated in the literature (e.g. IIDA ). However our aim is to present experiments with a large number of periods and with sufficiently many independent observations for meaningful applications of non-parametric significance tests. 2 If one wants to investigate results of day to day route choice which can be transferred to more realistic environments, it is necessary to explore individual behaviour in an interactive experimental set-up. Does behaviour converge to equilibrium? Does more feedback reduce fluctuations? What is the structure of individual responses to recent experiences? Our experimental study tries to throw light on these questions.
Experimental Set-Up
Subjects are told that in each of 200 periods they have to make a choice between a main road M and a side road S for travelling from A to B. They were told that M is faster if M and S are chosen by the same number of people. The number of subjects in each session was 18, mostly law and economic students from the University of The period payoff was 40 -t with t = if M was chosen and t = t if S was chosen.
M t S
The total payoff of a subject was the sum of all 200 period payoffs converted to money payoffs in DM with a fixed exchange rate of .015 DM for each experimental money unit (Taler).
Additionally, every participant received a lump sum payment of 200 Taler and a show-up fee of 10 DM. One session took roughly one and a half hours.
All pure equilibria of the game are characterized by The game underlying the experiment has many pure strategy equilibrium points. In all of them the number of participants on the side road is 6, but the set of players who choose S can be any set of 6 players. The multiplicity of pure strategy equilibria poses a coordination problem which may be one of the reasons for non-convergence and the persistence of fluctuations. Feedback on 6 both travel times vs. feedback on only own travel time has a beneficial effect by the reduction of fluctuations, but this effect is relatively small. There was a negative trend in each session of treatment II. By comparison in treatment I there were two sessions with a positive, two with a negative and two with an indifferent trend.
Road changes
The fluctuations are connected to the total number of road changes within one session.
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The Spearman-rank-correlation between the total number of road changes and the standard deviation of the number of participants per period on S is .795. This is significant on the level of 1 % (one sided). The median number of road changes is significantly higher in treatment I. The null-hypothesis is rejected by the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test on a level of 5 % (one sided).
The mean number of road changes under treatment I is also higher than under treatment II. A
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test rejects the null-hypothesis only on a very weak significance level of 8.98 % (one sided). Under treatment I subjects who mainly choose only one of the roads feel the need to travel on the other road from time to time in order to get information on both roads. Under treatment II there is 8 no necessity for such information gathering. This seems to be the reason for the greater number of changes and maybe also for the stronger fluctuations under treatment I. 
Payoffs
The mean payoffs per period in treatment I were significantly lower than in treatment II. The standard deviation of this random variable was higher in treatment I than in treatment II. In both cases a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test rejects the null-hypothesis on a significance level of 5 % 9 (one sided). Nevertheless the efficiency with regard to the pareto optimum was in treatment I .91
and in treatment II .92. The payoffs are shown in Table 3 One might see that the information about the travel time on both routes effects only a small difference concerning the payoffs.
Payoffs and road changes
In all sessions the number of road changes of a subject is negatively correlated with the subject's payoff. Figure 4 shows that the negative correlation between the payoff in treatment II is stronger than in treatment I. In both treatments the Spearman rank correlations between cumulative payoffs and the number of road changes are strictly negative. The Spearman-correlation-coefficients in treatment II are 11 lower than in treatment I. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney-Test rejects the null-hypothesis on a significance level of 5 % (one sided). It is observed that some players in treatment I get an above average payoff even though they have a high change rate. The reason why this effect is not so often observed in treatment II might be, that the additional information about the travel time of the non chosen route was given. So it is not necessary for players to change in order to collect information. This might explain, that 3 players always stayed on the main road in treatment II, nevertheless it is surprising that one player did the same in treatment I.
Even if subjects change roads in order to get higher payoffs, they do not succeed in doing this on the average. This suggests that it is difficult to use the information provided by the feedback to one's advantage.
Response mode
A participant who had a bad payoff on the road chosen may change his road in order to travel where it is less crowded. We call this the direct response mode. A road change is the more probable the worse the payoff was.
The direct response mode is the prevailing one but there is also a contrarian response mode.
Under the contrarian response mode a road change is more likely the better the payoff was. The 12 contrarian participant expects that a high payoff will attract many others and that therefore the road chosen will be crowded in the next period.
The equilibrium payoff is 10. Payoffs perceived as bad tend to be below 10 and payoffs perceived as good tend to be above 10. Accordingly we classified the response of a subject as direct if the road is changed after a payoff smaller than 10 or not changed after a payoff greater than 10. An opposite response is classified as contrarian. Table 2 shows the numbers of times in which a subject changes roads (c -for a payoff below 10 and c + for a payoff above 10), or stays at the same road (s -for a payoff below 10 and s + for a payoff above 10). For each subject such a 2x2 table has been determined and a Yule coefficient Q has been computed as follows.
The Yule coefficient has a range from -1 to +1. In our case a high Yule coefficient reflects a tendency towards direct responses and a low one a tendency towards contrarian responses.
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In each of four sessions, one of them in Treatment I and three in treatment II, there was one player for whom no Yule coefficient could be determined since these four subjects never change roads. These subjects are not considered in the evaluation of Yule coefficients.
The mean and the standard deviation of the Yule coefficients are shown in Table 6 Table 6 : Mean and standard deviation of the Yule coefficients in both treatments.
Evidence for the importance of both response modes can be found in the distributions of Yule coefficients within a session. If the two response modes were not present in behaviour one would expect distributions of Yule coefficients concentrated around 0. However the number of subjects with extreme Yule coefficients below -.5 or above +.5 tends to be greater than the number of subjects with Yule coefficients in the middle range between -.5 and +.5. A Wilcoxon one sample 14 test supports this alternative hypothesis by rejecting the null-hypothesis that none of both numbers tends to be greater than the other, on the significance level of 1 % (two sided).
If one classifies subjects with Yule coefficients above +.5 as direct responders and subjects with
Yule coefficients below -.5 as contrarian responders, then one receives 44 % direct responders, 14% contrarian responders and 42% unclassified subjects. The distribution of the Yule coefficients is shown in figure 6. 
Simulations
In order to get more insight into this theoretical significance of our result, we have run simulations based on a version of a well known reinforcement learning model, the payoff-sum 15 model. This model already described by Harley (1981) and later by Arthur (1991) has been used extensively by Ereth and Roth (1995) strategies, which are used in the simulations.
period:
Each player i chooses strategy j with probability å Table 7 explains the version underlying our simulations. (kasten) We are looking at player i who has to choose among n strategies 1,…,n over a number of periods t, t=1..T. The probabilities with which each strategy i is chosen is proportional to its "propensity"
. In period 1 these propensities are
exogenously determined parameters. Whenever the strategy j is used in period t, the resulting payoff is added to the propensity if this payoff is positive. If all payoffs are positive, then the propensity is the sum of all previous payoffs for this strategy plus its initial propensity. Therefore one can think of a propensity as a payoff sum.
t i a
In our experiments negative payoffs are not impossible. This creates a difficulty for the model, since one has to exclude the case that a propensity becomes negative. In the literature this is sometime solved by adding up the exponential of the payoffs instead of the payoffs themselves.
Here we take another approach to this problem. If a negative payoff is obtained for the use of the strategy x i , the absolute value of this payoff is added to all other propensities and the propensity of the strategy i remains unchanged. We think that this is the simplest generalisation of the original payoff sum model which was conceived for positive payoffs only.
In our simulations 18 players interact for 200 periods just like in our experiments. Each player has four strategies:
main road:
This strategy simply consists in taking the decision for the main road.
side road:
This strategy consists in taking the side road.
direct:
This strategy corresponds to the direct response mode. The payoff of a player is compared to his median payoff among his payoffs for all periods up to now. If the present payoff is 17 lower then this median payoff, then the road is changed. If the payoff is greater than this median payoff, the player stays on the same road as before. It may also happen that the current payoff is equal to the median payoff. In this case, the road is changed if the number of previous payoffs above the median is greater than the number of previous payoffs below the median. In the opposite case, the road is not changed. In the rare cases where both numbers are equal, the road is changed with probability ½.
contrarian:
A player who takes this strategy stays on the last chosen road if his current payoff is smaller then the median payoff among the payoffs for all previous periods and he changes the road in the opposite case. If the current payoff is equal to this median payoff, then he changes the road if the number of previous payoff below the median payoff is greater then the number above the median payoff. If the numbers of previous payoff below and above the median payoff are equal, the road is changed with probability ½.
In the first period only strategy one and two were available to the simulated subjects since strategy three and four cannot be applied because there is not yet a median of previous payoffs.
The strategies direct and contrarian describe the response modes discussed in section 4, but with a small difference. There changing and staying was conditioned on how the last payoff differed from the equilibrium payoff 10. In the experiments the median payoff is very often at 10.
However, in the simulations we did not want to build in prejudices based on theoretical values.
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Our simulated players base their behaviour on initial propensities and observations only. Of course, it is assumed that as in the experiments the players get feedback about their own payoffs immediately after their choices. In the experimental treatment II additional feedback about the payoff on the route not chosen was given. The payoff sum model makes use of a player's own payoff only and therefore ignores the additional feedback of treatment II.
The differences between treatment I and treatment II cannot be explained by the payoff sum model since it does not process the additional feedback information given in treatment II. For the purposes of comparing our simulation data with the experimental data we ignore the differences between treatment I and II which are not big anyhow.
The difficulty arises that the initial propensities must be estimated from the data. We did this by varying the initial propensities for the strategies main road and side road over all integer values from 1 to 10 and the initial propensities for the strategies direct and contrarian over all integer values from 0 to 10. We compared the simulation results with the six variables listed in table 8.
We aimed at simulation results which were between the minimum and maximum experimental results over all twelve sessions of treatment I and II. For each of the 12100 parameter combinations we have run 1000 simulations. There was only one parameter combination which satisfied the requirement of yielding means for the six variables between the minimal and maximal experimentally observed values. This was the parameter combination (4, 3, 3, 2 The distribution of the Yule coefficients shown by figure 7 suggests that during the play the behaviour of many simulated players more and more concentrates on one strategy. This is the result of different learning histories.
It is not clear that in the actual experiments tendencies toward direct and contrarian behaviour are mere results of the learning history during the play of the game. Probably some of the experimental subjects bring such tendencies already to the laboratory. This may be due to prior learning outside the laboratory or to inherited behavioural inclinations. We do not want to pass judgement on this but an initial heterogeneity might explain the somewhat smaller concentration 21 of the experimental data in the middle range. One could of course try to get an even closer agreement with the experimental data by using a simulation model with subject heterogeneity.
However this would involve the estimation of many more parameters.
Conclusion
The study has shown that the mean numbers on both roads tend to be very near to the equilibrium. Nevertheless, fluctuations persist until the end of the sessions in both treatments.
This is of particular interest in view of the fact that the experiments run over 200 periods which is unusually long and should be enough to show a tendency of convergence to equilibrium, if there is one.
Feedback on both road times significantly reduces fluctuations in treatment II compared to treatment I. However the effect is small. There is a significant rank correlation between the total number of road changes and the size of fluctuations. In treatment I road changes may serve the purpose of information gathering. This motivation has no basis in treatment II. However road changes may also be attempts to improve payoffs. The finding of a negative correlation between a subject's payoff and number of road changes suggests that on the average such attempts are not successful.
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Two response modes can be found in the data, a direct one in which road changes follow bad payoffs and a contrarian one in which road changes follow good payoffs. One can understand these response modes as due to different views of the causal structure of the situation. If one expects that the road which is crowded today is likely to be crowded tomorrow one will be in the direct response mode but if one thinks that many people will change to the other road because it was crowded today one has reason to be in the contrarian response mode. We have presented statistical evidence for the importance of the two response modes.
We have also run simulations based on a simple payoff sum reinforcement model. Simulated mean values of six variables have been compared with the experimentally observed minimal and maximal of these variables. The simulated means were always in this range. Only four parameters of the simulation model, the initial propensities, were estimated from the data. In view of the simplicity of the model it is surprising that one obtains a quite close fit to the experimental data. The response modes direct and contrarian also appear in the simulations as the result of an endogenous learning behaviour by which initially homogeneous subjects become differentiated over time.
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